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Abstract
Does vertical integration of an input innovator with a downstream
rm entail innovation foreclosure? We study the licensing incentives of an
independent input producer owning a patented product innovation which
allows the downstream rms to improve the quality of their nal goods.
We consider two-part tari¤ contracts for both outside and incumbent in-
novators. We nd that the incumbent innovator has always the incentive
to license its innovation to the rival rm so that under vertical integra-
tion complete technology di¤usion takes place. In contrast, the external
patent holder may prefer exclusive licensing depending on the innovation
size as well as on the set of allowed contracts. As a result vertical integra-
tion does not entail innovation foreclosure, rather it facilitates innovation
di¤usion with respect to vertical separation.
As for the protability, the vertical integration with either downstream
rm is always privately protable and it is welfare improving for large
innovations: this implies that not all protable mergers should be rejected.
Keywords: Patent licensing, product innovation, two-part tari¤, neg-
ative royalties, vertical di¤erentiation, vertical integration.
JEL Classication: L15, L13, L24.
1 Introduction
We develop a theoretical model to study the incentives of an independent input
innovator to di¤use its innovation either through licensing or through vertical
integration. We consider input innovations that improve the quality of the nal
good and/or possibly create vertical di¤erentiation in the product market.
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More precisely, we consider a standard vertical product di¤erentiation model
(Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, Mussa and Rosen, 1982) and we analyse two
downstream rms producing and selling a nal output to heterogeneous con-
sumers, and two di¤erentiated inputs in the upstream market, a low quality
input provided by competitive rms and a high quality patented input provided
by an independent input innovator. The quality of the nal good depends on
the quality of the input. Complete technology di¤usion implies a homogeneous
nal good of high quality, whereas exclusive licensing implies a vertically di¤er-
entiated market. We consider a general two-part tari¤ contract for both outside
and incumbent innovators. In particular, the set of possible contracts, that are
observable, is such that the xed fee has to be non-negative, whereas the per-
unit royalty might also be negative, that is, it could be a per-unit subsidy. The
motivation for such assumption comes from the observation that, while negative
xed fees would be clearly held to be illegal by antitrust authorities as they could
be a means to strand the rival rm out of the market, a per-unit subsidy cannot
a priori be considered welfare detrimental. We endogenize market structure
allowing the patent holder to vertically integrate with either downstream rm.
Formally, we develop the following game. First, the innovator decides whether
to enter the market through vertical integration. Second, in case of external
patent holder, the innovator o¤ers a contract to each downstream rm on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis; whereas, in case of internal patent holder, the vertically
integrated innovator o¤ers a contract to the rival. Third, the potential licensees
decide whether to accept or reject the contract. Finally the downstream rms
compete.
Main results. We nd that the incumbent innovator, that is, when the patent
holder decides to enter the market producing with the new input, has always
the incentive to license its innovation to the rival rm; so that under vertical
integration complete technology di¤usion takes place. In contrast, the external
patent holder, that is, when the innovator decides to stay vertically separated,
may prefer exclusive licensing depending on the innovation size as well as on
the set of allowed contracts. Namely, in case of negative royalties, exclusive
licensing always prevails; in contrast, when negative royalties are not allowed,
complete technology di¤usion occurs for small innovations, whereas exclusive
licensing does for large innovations. As a result, vertical integration facilitates
innovation di¤usion. At rst glance these incentives might seem counterintu-
itive. Indeed, one could expect the external patent holder to prefer complete
technology di¤usion because licensing is its only source of prot and the inter-
nal patent holder to prefer innovation foreclosure in order to benet from its
competitive advantage.
The insights are as follows. An incumbent patent holder always licenses the
product innovation thus preferring a homogeneous high quality good market
rather than a vertically di¤erentiated market in which the internal patentee
would be the high quality rm competing with a low quality producer. By set-
ting a positive royalty level and so raising its rival cost, the incumbent innovator
gains most of the market and leave the rival with its outside option. This way
it is able to reach a quasi-monopoly outcome.
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As for the outside inventor, in case of negative royalties, he optimally sells an
exclusive license via a two-part tari¤ contract that species a per-unit subsidy:
the innovator via the subsidy makes the unique licensee more aggressive in
the Cournot market and reap higher prot via the xed fee (Fershtman and
Judd, 1987). An alternative explanation is provided by Jing and Winter (2013)
that referring to Marvel (1982), point out that "an exclusivity contract can
protect investments by an upstream supplier against free-riding by competitors
on investments such as training that the supplier makes in retail relationships."
Instead, in case of non-negative royalties, the technology di¤usion depends
on the innovation size. In particular, the optimal contract under exclusive li-
censing only species a positive xed fee, whereas under complete technology
di¤usion the optimal contract species both a positive royalty and a positive
xed fee. Under both exclusive licensing and complete technology di¤usion,
the external patent holders prots increase with the innovation size. However,
the prot from exclusive licensing increases more than the prot from complete
technology di¤usion so that when the innovation is high enough exclusive licens-
ing becomes more protable than complete technology di¤usion. The reason for
this result is twofold. First, under exclusive licensing the patent holder has to
care about only one outside option, whereas under complete technology di¤u-
sion it has to care about two outside options. The higher is the innovation size,
the lower is the rmsoutside option and, in turn, the larger is the prot share
that the patent holder can get; in other words, the xed fees are increasing in
the innovation size. Under exclusive licensing this is the unique e¤ect at work,
given that the optimal per-unit royalty is zero. In contrast, under complete tech-
nology di¤usion, there is a second mechanism. In this case the prot has two
components: the xed fees and the revenues coming from the royalties. Disen-
tangling this latter component, it is easy to verify that the equilibrium per-unit
royalty increases but the equilibrium quantities produced by rms decrease with
the innovation size. Whereas the overall e¤ect is always positive, the presence
of this negative e¤ect combined with the presence of two outside options under
complete technology di¤usion explains why the prot under exclusive licensing
is larger than the prot under complete technology di¤usion for su¢ ciently high
values of the innovation size.
As far as the merger protability is concerned, under Cournot competition
the vertical integration of the upstream inventor with either downstream rm is
always privately protable. This result is in line with the new market foreclo-
sure theory (see Rey and Tirole 2007) according to which vertical integration
allows the monopolist upstream producer to protect its monopoly power. As
for the social protability, we nd that the merger is also welfare improving for
large innovations; this implies that not all protable mergers should be rejected.
Indeed, on one hand, the merger ensures the innovation di¤usion and pushes
prices down as it implies the (partial) internalization of the vertical externality;
on the other hand, the merger has an anticompetitive e¤ect because the verti-
cally integrated rm is able to (partially) foreclose the rival rm via a positive
per-unit royalty. The rst two positive e¤ects prevail as long as the quality
improvement associated with the innovation is su¢ ciently large. Thus, a very
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simple prescription arises: the antitrust authority should approve mergers where
large product innovations are involved.
Empirical evidence. There are several examples of innovation in input re-
quired for the production of nal goods that result in an improved quality. The
introduction of a faster computer chip; the wheat bread our made in the stone
mill as 200 years ago;1 the Loro Piana innovation in new materials (super-luxury
natural textiles).2
As for the di¤usion incentives, we can nd empirical support to our results
in the agrochemical and in the pharmaceutical sectors, for instance. In these
markets, it is quite usual to observe mergers and acquisitions of innovative
companies (external research laboratories) from big rms that then license the
patented product to the other rms. In 1996, Monsanto purchased Agracetus,
the biotechnology company that had generated the rst transgenic varieties
of cotton, soybeans, peanuts, and other crops, and from which Monsanto had
already been licensing technology since 1991.3 The patent on the rst type
of Roundup Ready crop that Monsanto produced (soybeans) has been broadly
licensed to other seed companies (about 150 companies, including Syngenta
and DuPont Pioneer).4 Most of Monsantos annual sales come from seeds,
increasingly of genetically modied (GM), or transgenic, varieties, and from
licensing genetic traits.5 Similarly "the Muenoz Group had worked steadily to
integrate vertically -...- in an attempt to control its produce business from seed
to plant to retailer..." In many cases this rm licenses its patented products
to grower-partners.6 Nespresso provides another example of internal patent
holder selling its own patented co¤ee machines and capsules in the market but
also licensing them to other retailers. The external patent holder may instead
decide not to completely di¤use the new product, especially when dealing with
large innovations. Some luxury or semi-luxury goods that are sold only by one
retailer in a town t our theoretical result. Methius wine is produced in Trentino
Alto-Adige and, in Milan, for instance, it is purchasable only in the wine shop
Cotti.
The soybean seed market makes a case study of vertical integration incen-
tives. As pointed out by Shi and Chavas (2011), recent advances in biotechnol-
ogy have led agricultural biotech rms (who produce the seeds sold to farmers)
to di¤erentiate their seed products through patented genetic materials. The
vertical organization of this industry has changed. While biotech rms pro-
ducing patented genes have relied extensively on licensing their technologies to
seed companies, they have recently increased their use of vertical coordination
through integration. Shi and Chavas (2011) use a Cournot model of multi-
1 It is a case of reswitching of techniques to traditional Italian whole wheat breads made
200 years ago when the local stone milled our was the only option.
2This thread starts with Tasmanian wool in the 1970s, through vicuna (LP was granted
10-year exclusivity), baby cashmere to, most recently, lotus ower cloth (i.e., the bers of
nelumbo nucifera, an aquatic perennial more commonly known as the lotus).
3See BOCA RATON, Fla., April 8,1996 W. R. Grace & Co. (NYSE: GRA).
4See Monsanto.com November 3, 2008 and Monsanto GMO Ignites Big Seed War. NPR.
5See http://www.economist.com/node/14904184.
6Harvard Business School case, the Muenoz Group.
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product rms and nd that seeds sold through vertically-integrated structures
are priced higher than those that are licensed.
Nevertheless, the merger guidelines do not exclude that vertical merger could
increase social welfare for e¢ ciency reasons. For instance, the European Com-
mission mentions in its recent Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal
mergers (2008): The Commission may decide that, as a consequence of the
e¢ ciencies that the merger brings about, there are no grounds for declaring the
merger incompatible with the common market pursuant to Article 2(3) of the
Merger Regulation. This will be the case when the Commission is in a position
to conclude on the basis of su¢ cient evidence that the e¢ ciencies generated by
the merger are likely to enhance the ability and incentive of the merged entity
to act pro-competitively for the benet of consumers, thereby counteracting
the adverse e¤ects on competition which the merger might otherwise have. In
contrast, the Swiss Competition Commission forces the (vertically integrated)
Swatch Group to sell its watch components to the competitors.7
As for the licensing contract, from an empirical point of view, per-unit sub-
sidies are rarely observed, however they might be present implicitly in the form
of transmission of know-how and technical assistance to the licensee (Liao and
Sen, 2005). There are examples in the personal computer industry that might
t this scenario. Gawer and Henderson (2007) explore Intels strategy with re-
spect to complements. They nd that Intel, as provider of microprocessors, an
essential input of the personal computer, may have the incentive to subsidize
complementsproduction by the development and widespread dissemination of
intellectual property.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on licensing a
product innovation as well as to the debate on the competitive e¤ects of vertical
integration.
Regarding the literature on optimal licensing, most papers focus on cost-
reducing, process innovations (see Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and Shapiro,
1986; Kamien, Oren and Tauman, 1992; Sen and Tauman, 2007; Erutku and
Richelle, 2007). Other papers investigate the issue of licensing a product inno-
vation.8 A rst contribution is by Kamien, Tauman and Zang (1988). They
consider the introduction of a new product in a Cournot oligopoly focusing on
the xed fee licensing mode. More recently, Lemarié (2005) compare xed fee
versus royalty for a demand-enhancing innovation. Our departure from this lit-
erature is threefold. First, we consider an innovation that improves the quality
of a product.9 Second, we extend the analysis to the case of negative per-unit
royalties, whereas the focus is generally on contracts that do not allow for per-
unit subsidies. Finally, we endogenize the role of the innovator by letting it
7Harvard Business School case, "The Swatch Group".
8As pointed out by Kamien et al. (1988) a product innovation can be regarded as a cost
reducing innovation by assuming that the new product could have been produced before but
with a su¢ ciently high marginal cost that rendered its production unprotable."
9Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2008) analyse optimal licensing for an outside inventor of
an innovation that improves the quality of a product and also a¤ects its marginal cost (the
innovation can be classied as product and process at the same time). They consider the logit
demand framework with price competition.
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decide whether to enter the market, whereas typically the innovator is exoge-
nously assumed to be either an incumbent or an external patent holder.
As far as the non-negative royalty case is concerned, in line with the theo-
retical result by Sen and Tauman (2007), we nd that the external patent holder
optimally sells an exclusive license via a xed fee, when the innovation is very
large, and sells two licenses via a positive per-unit royalty as long as the innova-
tion is not too small, thus tting the wide prevalence of per-unit royalties over
xed fee in practice (see for instance, Rostoker (1984)).
As for the internal patent holder, complete technology di¤usion takes place
and the optimal contract is a pure royalty policy. Again, this result is line with
Sen and Tauman (2007).10 Arya and Mittendorf (2006) study the incentives of
an internal patent holder to license a product innovation in the presence of a
monopolist input producer. They nd that the licensing incentive is positive
as it a¤ects the input pricing terms in a way that is benecial for the internal
patent holder even though it implies giving up the monopoly power on the nal
good. We also nd that the internal innovator has incentive to license the new
good to the rival, however, the reason is to extract some surplus from the rival
rm that is active in the market independently of the licensing strategy.
Concerning the negative royalty case, to the best of our knowledge the main
contributions are Liao and Sen (2005) and Milliou and Petrakis (2007). Our
paper is more closely related to Liao and Sen (2005) that study optimal licensing
of a process innovation in a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods. They
show that subsidy-based contracts are optimal under exclusive licensing but
not under complete technology di¤usion. They conclude that negative royalties
are welfare improving with respect to non-negative royalties if the innovation
is su¢ ciently small. We depart from this paper in what we endogenize market
structure and we nd that vertical integration is protable independently of
whether negative royalties are allowed.
Finally, as for the competitive e¤ects of vertical integration, the new market
foreclosure theory points out that vertical integration can restrict downstream
competition. In particular in the recent survey by Rey and Tirole (2007) it is
shown that vertical integration is always protable as the upstream producer
can restore its monopoly power through input foreclosure, but vertical integra-
tion is anticompetitive. Reisinger and Tarantino (2013) extend the theory of
Rey and Tirole (2007) by analysing the protability of vertical integration in the
presence of complementary input producers and show that vertical integration
can be privately unprotable (for earlier works on complementary inputs see
Arya and Mittendorf (2007) and Laussel (2008)). In particular, vertical integra-
tion raises the market prot of the merging entity and it is therefore protable;
however, the presence of a complementary input implies that part of this larger
prot can be extracted by the supplier of this input. This expropriation e¤ect
can render vertical integration unprotable. In our framework vertical integra-
tion remains privately protable but the social welfare protability depends on
10There are also previous contributions about an internal patent holder, see inter alia Wang
(1998 and 2002).
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the innovation size. Our results contrast with Sandonís and Faulí-Oller (2006)
that consider non-drastic process innovations in a horizontally di¤erentiated
Cournot duopoly, and nd that the merger is privately protable only for small
innovations and all protable mergers are welfare detrimental. They point out
the commitment problem faced by the vertical merger (that is the insider inno-
vator) which has only one instrument, the licensing contract to the rival rm
rather than two (a licensing contract to each downstream rm), and cannot cred-
ibly restrict its output as the new input is transferred at marginal cost. In our
model, this result breaks down as the incentive to di¤use the innovation makes
homogeneous the downstream market. Another related paper on the implication
of vertical integration is Milliou and Petrakis (2012) that consider an upstream
monopolist selling an essential input to two competing asymmetric downstream
rms. They study the upstream monopolists incentive to vertically integrate
with the more e¢ cient downstream rm given that vertical integration creates
the possibility of knowledge disclosure, and they analyse the integrated rms
incentive to disclose it to its downstream rival. They nd that under vertical
integration knowledge is disclosed, rmsinnovation incentives, consumer and
total welfare increase, whereas the rivals cost decreases. Even though in line
with our results on the di¤usion incentives of vertical integration, Milliou and
Petrakis (2012) abstract from licensing and they focus on linear pricing where
the two downstream rms di¤er in their constant marginal cost of production
so that under vertical integration knowledge disclosure to the rival entails the
di¤usion of a sort of process innovation.
Recently, Chambolle et al. (2015), Milliou and Pavlou (2013) and Schmidt
(2014) even though considering di¤erent models, point out somewhat similar in-
novation gains coming from mergers in vertically related industries. Chambolle
et al. (2015) consider a monopolist retailers incentive to develop a premium
private label either through outsourcing or through vertical integration. They
nd that vertical integration induces more quality investment than outsourcing
because of a hold-up e¤ect.11 The other two contributions instead focus on the
e¢ ciency gains of horizontal mergers. Milliou and Pavlou (2013) analyse a bi-
lateral duopoly and study the e¤ects of upstream mergers on R&D investments.
They nd that mergers can induce an increase in R&D investments and in turn
e¢ ciency gains that are passed on to consumers. Finally, Schmidt (2014) con-
siders complementary patents owned by di¤erent IP holders and necessary to
produce a nal good. In this framework two external e¤ects arise: the comple-
ments e¤ect that could be solved by horizontal merger and the double mark-up
e¤ect that could be solved by vertical merger. He compares the two business
strategies of vertical and horizontal integration concluding in favor of the latter
as a way to stimulate innovation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we rst set
11For details on the spread of private labels products and buyer power of large retailers
see Inderst (2013). He analyses a bilateral monopoly and studies the innovation activity of
both the manufacturer and the retailer. He isolates two e¤ects: a standard hold-up problem
for the manufacturer and a rent appropriation motive for the retailer. The result is that the
innovation activity may ine¢ ciently switch to a large retailer when it attains su¢ cient size.
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up the ante-innovation model and we then introduce the product innovation. In
Sections 3 and 4 we study the optimal licensing of an external and an internal
innovator, respectively. In Section 5, we endogenize the vertical integration
decision by comparing the private incentives of the patent holder; we nally
compare the social incentives of vertical integration versus vertical separation.
In Section 6, we discuss the main assumptions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
The formal details (the solutions of the subgames) and the proofs of our results
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Status quo
We consider two rms producing a homogeneous good and competing à la
Cournot. Final output production requires an essential input provided by a
competitive upstream market.
As far as the demand side is concerned, we assume that there is a continuum
of consumers indexed by  which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1].
Thus,  is a taste parameter. Each consumer has a unit demand and buys either
one unit of a good of quality s at price p or buys nothing at all. Consumers
utility takes the following form:
U() =

s  p, if consumer type  buys
0, if does not buy
The demand for the good is then
Q (p) = 1 
p
s

() p (Q) = s (1 Q) ; (1)
where Q = q1 + q2 and p=s is the fraction of consumers with a taste parameter
less than , that is the fraction of consumers not buying the good.12 For future
reference we dene the consumer surplus as
CS (s) =
1Z
p
s
(s  p) d = (p  s)
2
2s
(2)
As for the supply side, the essential input of quality s is produced at zero
xed cost fL = 0 and at constant marginal cost c = 0 and it is sold at the
competitive price w = 0. In this framework quality is assimilated to input. The
downstream (D) rm i prot function is: i = pqi. D rms compete in the
12At equilibrium the market is uncovered, that is Q < 1.
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quantities, then the Cournot duopoly equilibrium is:
qi (ci = 0; cj = 0; s; s) =
1
3
; Q = q1 + q2 =
2
3
(3)
p =
s
3
i =
s
9
; PS =
2
9
s (4)
CS =
2
9
s; SW = CS + PS =
4
9
s
The D rms price and prots depend on the quality of the input s. Q de-
notes total output, which corresponds to the demand for the input faced by the
upstream (U) market (perfect vertical complementarity).13
2.2 Innovation
Suppose that an independent input producer obtains a patented product inno-
vation which allows the downstream rms to improve the quality of their nal
goods. In the upstream market there is now a monopolist selling an input that
ameliorates nal product quality by  > 1 that measures the innovation size;
so that with this innovation the quality goes from s to s . Assume that the
invention of the new high quality input entails a xed cost fH = f > 0. Apart
from this, production costs are then zero.14
We study the licensing incentives of this patent holder. The U rm can sell
the new input either to one or both D rms via a two-part licensing contract
(r; F ). We consider the set of possible contracts such that r 2 R and F 
0. Indeed, whereas negative xed fees would be clearly held to be illegal by
antitrust authorities,15 a negative per-unit royalty, that is, a per-unit subsidy
(given that the marginal cost is equal to zero), cannot a priori be considered
welfare detrimental. Some recent contributions on licensing point out the private
incentives to subsidize the downstream production (Liao and Sen (2005) and
Milliou and Petrakis (2007)), that in some cases are also welfare improving.
In order to determine the upfront fee of the two-part tari¤ contract we
assume that once the innovator chooses the number of licenses m = f1; 2g
to o¤er and the per-unit royalty r, the fee is determined through a rst-price
sealed-bid auction and m highest bidders win the license.16 This is the so called
13Note that we could also consider a market interval [a1; a2] with a2 > a1 > 0, however
this would require conditions on the parameters to be satised at equilibrium to ensure that
the market is either covered or uncovered. In particular, in case of covered market, Cournot
competition would be constrained; whereas in case of uncovered market the equilibrium results
would be qualitatively the same.
14We discuss about this assumption in Section 6.
15As you will see from the following equilibrium analysis, in fact, it emerges that our re-
striction to non negative fees is binding only for the internal patent holder, that, if allowed,
would induce the nonintegrated rm to produce a nil quantity (foreclosure) by compensating
it for the outside option.
16 In case of tie, that is relevant only under exclusive licensing, we assume, without loss of
generality, that rm 2 innovates.
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auction plus royalty (AR) policy.17
According to the U innovator licensing incentives, di¤erent cases derive:
1. Complete technology di¤usion: all D rms adopt the new input and we
have a homogeneous nal good of quality s > s. D rmsprots i (ci; cj ; s ; s )
depends on the two part-tari¤ contracts ci = (ri; Fi) with i = 1; 2 and
i 6= j.
2. Exclusive licensing : only one of the D rms adopts the new input and we
have two nal goods of di¤erent qualities. The non-innovating rm, say
rm 1, produces the low quality good thus incurring zero production costs
and gains 1 (0; c2; s; s ); while the innovating rm 2 produces the high
quality good and gets 2 (c2; 0; s ; s).
Notice that this formulation of the model entails that input production is
carried out solely by the patent holder and that obtaining a license implies for
the rm the right to receive the high quality input from the patent holder. This
is slightly di¤erent from a standard patent licensing model where a licensee
produces the good itself after receiving the innovation. However, our assump-
tion of zero variable production costs makes equivalent these two perspectives
(whether, once sustained the xed cost to invent the new input, this is produced
by the patent holder or by the licensee(s)).
3 Vertical separation (external patent holder)
Under vertical separation the innovator stays out of the market. We develop
the following three-stage game: rst, the innovator o¤ers a contract to each D
rm on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; second, the potential licensees decide whether
to accept or reject the contract; nally the D rms compete. Note that all the
contracts are observable.18 Two possible subgames derive from the innovators
licensing incentives: either exclusive licensing or complete technology di¤usion.
Under exclusive licensing, suppose only rm 2 adopts the new input so that rm
2 sells the high quality good at price p2 and rm 1 sells the low quality good at
price p1. Consumer type  utility takes the following form:
U() =
8<: s   p2, if consumer type  buys the high quality good,s  p1, if consumer type  buys the low quality good,
0, if does not buy.
From the above formulation of the utility function, we can dene the consumer
indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all, and the
17Alternatively, one could consider the upfront fee plus royalty (FR) policy, that is such
that the innovator chooses the number of rms to whom the license is o¤ered, the per-unit
royalty and the xed fee that each licensee has to pay (in this case the innovator makes a
binding commitment that it will not sell the innovation to any rm outside the chosen subset).
However, it can be proved that the patent holder always prefers the AR policy over the FR
policy. See Liao and Sen (2005).
18This is an usual assumption in patent licensing.
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one indi¤erent between buying the low quality good and the high quality good,
as follows:
 =
p1
s
;
b = p2   p1
s (   1) :
We focus on the case in which both rms are active in the market, i.e., 0 <
 < b < 1, that is, p2 2 (p1 ; p1 + s (   1)), which is non-empty for p1 < s.
More precisely, in order to nd the Cournot equilibrium, we proceed as follows.
We assume that the demands for both goods are positive (formally, this means
that 0 <  = p1s <
b = p2 p1s(  1) < 1), in the Appendix (8.1), where we solve
for the Cournot equilibrium, we derive the corresponding candidate equilibrium
and we nally check whether this is the e¤ective equilibrium. The demands for
the goods, in this price region, are then:19
q1 = b    (5)
q2 = 1  b: (6)
Whereas under complete technology di¤usion both rms sell the high quality
good at price p . Consumer type  utility takes the following form:
U() =

s   p , if consumer type  buys,
0, if does not buy.
So that the demand for the good, in the price region p < s , is dened as:20
Q
 
p 

= 1 

p 
s 

:
Solving backwards, we nd the Nash equilibrium for the external patent
holder subgame, that is, its optimal licensing incentives, that we gather in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If negative royalties are allowed, the external patent holder
prefers exclusive licensing. The optimal contract is:
rELneg2 =  
s
2
< 0; FELneg2 =
 
4 2 + 1

s
4 (4   1) :
If instead negative royalties are not allowed, the external patent holder prefers
exclusive licensing for a su¢ ciently high product innovation, namely  >  =
19Outside this price region, either both rms do not produce or only one rm produces a
positive quantity: for these pairs of prices, demand functions (5) and (6) do not apply. In
the Supplementary material, we provide the demand functions for every pair of non-negative
prices.
20 In the Appendix, we verify that, at equilibrium, p
 
s 
< 1.
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1:8, and complete technology di¤usion otherwise. The optimal contract under
non-negative royalties is: for  >  ,
rEL2 = 0; F
EL
2 =
(   1) s 
(4   1) ;
for    ,8<: r1 = r2 = rT =
(s  26s 2+16s 3)
64 2 14 +4 , F
T
 
rT ; rT

=
(248 2 17  272 3+256 4+1)s 
4(32 2 7 +2)2 if  2
h
 T ;  
i
;
r1 = r2 = 0, FT (0; 0) =
(  1)(16  1)s 
9(4  1)2 if  <  
T = 1:585 6:
(7)
Proof. See Appendix (8.3).
Under the case of negative royalties, the innovator optimally sells an ex-
clusive license via a two-part tari¤ contract that species a per-unit subsidy:
the innovator via the subsidy makes the unique licensee more aggressive in the
Cournot market, that is subsidization allows the innovator to conquer most of
the downstream market by selling the high quality good and reap higher prot
via the xed fee (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Liao and Sen (2005) consider non-
drastic process innovations in a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous goods and
nd similar results for the di¤usion incentives of the external patent holder, ex-
cept that in our product innovation framework, exclusive licensing prevails also
under non-negative royalties, for the case of a large enough product innovation.
As for the case of non-negative royalties, the technology di¤usion as well as
the optimal contract (in particular the positiveness of the royalty) depends on
the innovation size. When the innovation is very small, the inventors incentive
is to sell two licenses via a per-unit price as low as possible, that is the optimal
contract is a xed fee. In other words, given the positive outside option of
producing the low quality good at zero marginal cost, for very small innovations
the inventor cannot set a positive per unit royalty. For intermediate innovations
we have again complete technology di¤usion but with a positive per-unit royalty.
Finally, for large innovations, exclusive licensing takes place. This result could
resemble what happens under optimal licensing of process innovations, where
the cost-reducing innovation is sold to only one rm via a xed fee when it
is drastic. Note however, that it is not possible in our scenario to distinguish
between drastic and non-drastic product innovations, as for any innovation size
 both rms attain to stay in the market at equilibrium. In order to get an
intuition for this result, it is useful to go through the di¤erent components of the
patent holder prots. First, notice that in both cases of technology di¤usion,
licensee is outside option is the same and it is equal to i (0; rj ; s; s ).21 Under
exclusive licensing the patent holder has to care about only one outside option
21As detailed in the Appendix, under exclusive licensing, assuming that the patent holder
o¤ers the innovation to rm 2 (and to rm 1 if rm 2 does not accept), its outside option is
2 (0; r1; s; s ) =
(s +r1)
2
(4  1)2s , and under complete technology di¤usion it is 1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s +r2)
2
(4  1)2s , given that we reasonably assume r1 = r2.
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whereas under complete technology di¤usion it has to care about two outside
options. This outside option is decreasing in  : the higher is the innovation size,
the lower is the rmsoutside option and in turn the larger is the prot share
that the patent holder can get; in other words, the xed fees are increasing
in  . Under exclusive licensing this is the unique e¤ect at work given that
the optimal per-unit royalty is zero. In contrast, under complete technology
di¤usion, the prot has two components: the xed fees and the revenues coming
from the royalties. Disentangling this latter component, it is easy to verify that
as  increases, the equilibrium per-unit royalty increases but the equilibrium
quantities produced by rms decrease.22 Whereas the overall e¤ect is always
positive, the presence of this negative e¤ect combined with the presence of two
outside options under complete technology di¤usion explains why the prot
under exclusive licensing is larger than the prot under complete technology
di¤usion for su¢ ciently high values of  .23
Furthermore, the following remark is worthy.
Remark 2 As the two-part tari¤ contracts o¤ered to each D rm are observ-
able, the U monopolist could implement the monopoly outcome. However, the U
monopolist has not incentive to implement this outcome.
The U monopolist could indeed set a royalty such that each rm produces
half monopoly quantity:
q1 =
1
3s 
(s   2r1 + r2) = 1
4
;
q2 =
1
3s 
(s   2r2 + r1) = 1
4
() r1 = 14s ; r2 = 14s . This implies the following total quantity, price, and
industry prot: Qm = 12 , p
m = 12 s, PS
m = 14 s. So that U prot is given
by the per-unit royalty times the quantity produced, plus the fees received by
the licensees: mU =
1
4s 
1
2+2

1
16 s  2516 (4   1) 2  2s

= s  41 +32 
2+2
8(4  1)2 .
24
However the U monopolist has not incentive to implement this outcome because
of the presence of the D rms outside options. More precisely, comparing
this prot with the equilibrium prots obtained with the contracts identied
in Proposition 1, (expressions 16 and 17 of prots with negative and positive
royalties provided in the Appendix) we nd that this contract to implement the
monopoly outcome is not protable, even if side payments (F lower than 0)
were allowed.25
22 @
@ 
rT > 0 and @
@ 
qT (s ) < 0.
23Formally, for  >  T , @
@ 
ELU >
@
@ 
TU > 0. The equilibrium expressions for the prots,
producer surpluses (industry prots) and consumer surpluses are provided in the Appendix
(8.2).
24Notice that this prot is positive i¤  > 1:23.
25There is also another contract that could implement the monopoly outcome:
r = 0; F =
mH (0)
2
  i (0; 0; s; s ) =  s
8
   
2s
(4   1)2 =
 
16 2   16 + 1 s 
8 (4   1)2
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Finally comparing the agentspayo¤s and social welfares before and after
the introduction of the innovation, we conclude the following results.
Corollary 3 As a result of the innovation: consumers are better o¤ and the
licensees (the downstream rms) are worse o¤ with respect to the status quo; as
long as the xed cost is su¢ ciently low, the social welfare increases.
Proof. See Appendix (8.4).
It is worth emphasizing that the licensees are worse o¤ with respect to the
status quo, in both cases of exclusive licensing and complete technology di¤u-
sion. Interestingly, under complete technology di¤usion they face a prisoners
dilemma: accepting the innovation is a weakly dominant strategy for both rms,
however they would be better o¤ by not accepting the innovation.26
Corollary 4 Whenever the patent holder is outside the market, allowing for
negative royalties is welfare improving for any innovation size.
Proof. See Appendix (8.5).
Although in case of negative royalties the innovation is not completely dif-
fused, thanks to production subsidizing consumer surplus and total welfare turn
out to be higher under exclusive licensing. The increase of output induced by
the per-unit subsidy overcompensates the lower average quality in the market.27
Liao and Sen (2005) show that negative royalties are welfare improving with re-
spect to non-negative royalties if the innovation is su¢ ciently small. They point
out the importance of the cost of exclusion: the additional cost that the non-
licensee rm has to pay under exclusive licensing. As long as this cost is low,
exclusive licensing (that arises with negative royalties) is preferred with respect
to complete technology di¤usion.
where mH (0) is the monopoly prot in case of high quality good and zero marginal cost
and the outside option is not buying the innovation given that the rival does. In this case
U gets U = 2

(16 2 16 +1)s 
8(4  1)2

, the D rms get: 1 = 2 = (4   1) 2  2s (which is
incentive compatible). Comparing this contract with (7) from U viewpoint we obtain that this
contract is superior. However this is not credible because when U o¤ers a zero per-unit royalty,
each D rm has the incentive to deviate from half monopoly quantity (prisoners dilemma)
knowing that the rival has zero marginal cost and produces half monopoly quantity. Indeed
by deviating it would be able to pay the xed fee and to get higher prot. The result of the
one-shot game would be that they produce the duopoly quantity and they are not able to pay
the xed fee.
26Formally, this is evident by considering the second stage of the licensing game in normal
form, where the row player is rm 1 and the column player is rm 2, their strategy is either
A (accept) or N (not):
A N
A 
 
0; rT ; s; s 

; 
 
0; rT ; s; s 

1
 
rT ; 0; s ; s
  b; 2  0; rT ; s; s 
N 1
 
0; rT ; s; s 

; 2
 
rT ; 0; s ; s
  b s
9
; s
9
27Note that in constrast, if negative royalties were not allowed, CS and SW would be higher
under complete technology di¤usion: SWEL   SWT < 0 and CSEL   CST < 0.
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4 Vertical integration (internal patent holder)
We have considered, so far, the case of an external innovator, that is, the U
rm does not sell the nal good in the D market. Suppose now that the U
producer and one of the two D rms, say rm 2, merge, in this case the vertically
integrated (VI) rm is an internal patent holder, that is a rm in the market
producing with the new input. Note that as a consequence of being a unique
entity it is not possible for the VI patent holder to replicate the deal with vertical
separation because the upstream subsidiary cannot commit to shut down its
downstream subsidiary. Therefore, its prot consists of two parts: the prot
from selling the high quality nal good 2 and the prot from selling the new
input to the rival D rm 1 (if it decides to license).
We consider the following three-stage game: rst, the patent holder (the VI
rm) o¤ers a contract to the rival rm 1, rm 1 decides whether to accept it
and, nally, market competition takes place. Solving backwards, we nd the
Nash equilibrium for the internal patent holder subgame, that is, its optimal
licensing incentives that we gather in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 The internal patent holder always sells the innovation to the
rival rm. The optimal contract is the two-part tari¤:
rV I =
s
 
 (4   1)  3 p 
2 (4   1) > 0; FV I = 0:
Proof. See Appendix (8.7).
Proposition 5 concerns the rms incentive to license the product innovation
thus preferring a homogeneous high quality good market rather than a verti-
cally di¤erentiated market in which the internal patentee would be the high
quality rm competing with a low quality producer. The intuition relies on Bo-
nanno (1986) where the author investigates the e¤ect of the type of competition
(Bertrand vs Cournot) on rmsincentives to (vertically) product di¤erentiate.
He shows that (with zero production costs) the two rms decide to produce a ho-
mogeneous high quality product under Cournot competition and di¤erentiated
products under Bertrand competition.
The result of Proposition 5 points out the incentive for the VI innovator
to partially foreclose the rival rm via a positive royalty. More precisely, the
equilibrium royalty, rV I , is increasing in  so that the larger is the innovation
the lower is the quantity produced by the rival non-a¢ liate. In other words,
as the innovation size  increases the rivals outside option decreases and, in
turn, the larger is the market share that the internal patentee is able to gain.
The result is that, the larger is  , the more the market equlibrium approaches
a monopoly.
Arya and Mittendorf (2006) study the incentives of an internal patent holder
to license an innovation on the nal good in the presence of a monopolist input
producer. In their model the decision to license the innovation implies giving
up the monopoly power on the nal good, that is, letting a Cournot rival rm
enter the market. They nd that the licensing incentive is positive as doing so
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the internal patent holder creates a "weak" rival (as the rival has the additional
marginal cost equal to the per-unit royalty) that induces the external supplier to
make better pricing conditions. We also nd that the VI (input) innovator has
incentive to license the new good to the rival. The reason is that through partial
input foreclosure the innovator attains to extract some surplus from the rival
rm that however would be active in the market independently of the licensing
strategy.
Notice that the optimal licensing policies in case of non-negative royalties
for both the external and the internal patent holder are in line with previ-
ous contributions on process innovations (see among others, Sen and Tauman
(2007) studying optimal licensing of process innovations in a Cournot oligopoly
with homogeneous goods). We contribute to this optimal licensing literature by
conrming and extending their results to the case of product innovations.
5 Private and social protability of vertical in-
tegration
We can now consider the merger protability comparing the vertical integra-
tion scenario with the vertical separation scenario (i.e., internal versus external
patent holder). We gather our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Vertical integration is always privately protable. However, it
is welfare improving if and only if the innovation is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix (8.8).
The private protability result is in line with the new market foreclosure
theory according to which VI allows the U monopolist to protect its monopoly
power. More precisely Rey and Tirole (2007) point out that vertical integration
is a device to restore the U monopoly power that cannot be exerted under
vertical separation when contracts are unobservable. In our model, contracts
are observable, however, due to the strategic outside option, the external patent
holder has not incentive to implement the monopoly outcome. Another way to
look at this result is that VI is a device for the patent holder to make price
discrimination (given that it can sell the innovation at marginal cost to its own
a¢ liate and at a positive price to the rival rm); this option is not available
under VS because the patent holder cannot credibly commit to make di¤erent
prices.28
As for the social protability, as long as negative royalties are not allowed,
for large innovations ( >  ), vertical integration induces complete technology
di¤usion that would not be privately protable for an external patent holder
(that prefers exclusive licensing). In contrast, for small innovations, when the
28Considering a scenario where rst the patent holder o¤ers a license to rm 1 via the
contract (r1 = 0; F1) and second the patent holder o¤ers another license to rm 2 via the
contract (r2; F2), we nd that the royalty o¤ered to the second rm is non-positive. This
scenario is dominated by the optimal contracts that we nd.
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new input is sold to all rms in the market under vertical separation, vertical
integration is socially unprotable. In other words, VI entails an anticompeti-
tive e¤ect because the VI rm is able to (partially) foreclose the rival rm via
a positive per-unit royalty. Nevertheless, as long as the external patent holder
prefers exclusive licensing, in the case of large innovations, VI by promoting the
innovation di¤usion, has the e¤ect of improving the quality in the market. This
last e¤ect, when present, always compensates the anticompetitive e¤ect. Un-
der negative royalties the qualitative results are the same. In contrast with the
case of non-negative royalties, the technology di¤usion does not depend on the
innovation size: the external patent holder always prefers exclusive licensing, so
that the market is vertically di¤erentiated; whereas, the internal patent holder
always sells the innovation to the rival, so that in the market there is a homo-
geneous good of high quality. Therefore, under vertical separation, the double
marginalization problem disappears because the innovating rm is subsidized
and the non-innovating rm buys the input from competitive rms: competi-
tion in the market is rather strong. In contrast, under VI competition in the
market is rather mild but there is a market quality improvement. The latter
positive e¤ect prevails whenever the innovation size is large enough.
We conclude that allowing for negative royalties does not a¤ect the market
outcome as, under both negative and non-negative royalties, the patent holder
chooses to vertically integrate with either rm and to sell the innovation to the
rival in the market. Figure 1 shows VI and licensing as the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game.
U
VI VS
No
lic
Two
lic
One
lic
One
lic
Figure 1: game tree
Under non-negative royalties, it is worth comparing these results with San-
donís and Faulí-Oller (2006) that consider non-drastic process innovations in a
horizontally di¤erentiated Cournot duopoly and study the patentees incentives
to merge with either rm in the market. They show that the merger is privately
protable for small innovations and it is welfare improving for large innovations.
They argue that all protable mergers are welfare detrimental. In our model the
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merger is protable for any innovation size  and the protability of VI increases
with the innovation size because of the input foreclosure incentive pointed out in
Proposition 5. This input foreclosure incentive does not take place in Sandonìs
and Faulì-Oller (2006), where the VI rm gains from the market served by the
rival rm, i.e., the VI rm prefers the duopoly (with very di¤erentiated goods)
rather than a quasi-monopoly. This explains why, in our model, VI dominates
VS also for high values of  . In sum, for the private protability of VI, the key
di¤erence of our results with respect to Sandonìs and Faulì-Oller (2006) is prod-
uct di¤erentiation; indeed in their framework, when goods are homogeneous VI
becomes protable for any innovation size.
6 Discussion
We next discuss the main assumptions of our model.
Production costs. We assume that, apart from the xed cost for invent-
ing the new input, production costs for the high quality input are equal to zero.
This is a simplifying assumption that allows us to keep neat our results. It is
also in line with previous contributions on licensing, see Li and Wang (2010,
p. 520) and in line with previous contributions on vertical di¤erentiation, see
among others, Motta (1993, p. 114), Ishibashi and Matsushima (2009, p. 138).
However one may wonder what happens if variable production costs are posi-
tive. To this aim we distinguish two cases. First, production costs that only
depend on the quality, in the absence of quality choice, would not change the
di¤usion incentives as they should be sustained under both exclusive licensing
and complete technology di¤usion. Secondly, production costs that depend on
the quantity would clearly change the quantitative results by a¤ecting the equi-
librium contracts. For instance, positive constant marginal costs for the high
quality input would be passed through the per-unit royalty, without a¤ecting
our qualitative results, even though the negative royalties case would be replaced
by a royalty lower than the marginal cost (in line with Milliou and Petrakis,
2007).
Three downstream rms. In the baseline model we consider a duopoly
in the D market. This is a quite usual assumption as well as a benchmark
in the literature, see, among others, Sandonís and Faulí-Oller (2006), Milliou
and Petrakis (2007), Liao and Sen (2005). Hence, our approach, on one hand,
allows us to get interesting and clear results on the licensing as well as on the
vertical integration incentives; on the other hand, it allows us to draw the proper
comparisons with the existing contributions.
Nevertheless, in order to understand whether the result that vertical integra-
tion facilitates innovation di¤usion is robust, we extend the model considering
the case of three rms in the D market. Formal details are provided in the Sup-
plementary material. We next provide our results. Under vertical separation,
that is, as long as the patent holder stays out of the market, whenever nega-
tive royalties are allowed, the patent holder optimally sells two licensees (partial
technology di¤usion). If negative royalties are not allowed, partial technology
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di¤usion prevails again unless the innovation size is su¢ ciently low, in this case
complete technology di¤usion takes place. As for vertical integration, we distin-
guish two cases: either the U innovator merges with one out of three rms or the
U innovator merges with two out of three rms. In the rst scenario, complete
technology di¤usion prevails unless, under negative royalties, the innovation size
is su¢ ciently small in which case partial technology di¤usion takes place (the
VI rm sells only one license); in the second scenario, which coincides with the
VI scenario of our baseline model, the innovation is always sold to the rival
non-a¢ liate. Therefore, the innovation di¤usion incentives are in line with the
baseline model in that complete technology di¤usion (resp. partial technology
di¤usion) is more likely to occur under vertical integration (resp. vertical sep-
aration). However, in this extension, vertical integration lacks the protability
property. More precisely, vertical integration is not privately nor socially prof-
itable anymore. The explanation is twofold. On one hand, the protability of
vertical separation increases because the D rmsoutside options decrease due
to the tougher competition. On the other hand, vertical integration with one
out of three rms makes the (quasi-) monopoly outcome unprotable because
there are now two non-a¢ liate rms to compensate. Moreover, vertical sepa-
ration is preferred to vertical integration with two out of three rms because
this VI scenario entails a vertical as well as a horizontal merger, so that the
positive e¤ect coming from the internalization of the vertical externality does
not compensate the negative e¤ect of internalizing the horizontal externality.
As for the social welfare, VI with one out of three rms is never socially
protable. The external patent holder sells at least two licenses, so that in the
market we have either two innovating rms competing with one non-innovating
rm or three innovating rms. The main consequence when moving from VS
to this scenario of VI is that, even though the innovation is at least as di¤used
as under VS, the VI rm is able to partially foreclose the non-a¢ liate rms.
So that the anticompetitive e¤ect of VI overcompensates the positive e¤ect in
terms of quality improvement. A fortiori, VI with two out of three rms is never
socially protable. Indeed, in this case VI implies one less rm in the market,
without any positive e¤ect in terms of quality improvement.
7 Conclusion
We have analysed the optimal licensing strategy of an upstream input innovator
producing a new input which improves the quality of the nal goods. We have
considered a duopoly downstream market and two-part tari¤ contracts with
non-negative xed fees and either non-negative per-unit royalties or per-unit
subsidies. We have shown that, under Cournot competition complete tech-
nology di¤usion takes place and the innovator always prefers to be inside the
market as the vertical merger with either downstream rm is always privately
protable. It is also welfare improving for large innovations. We thus show that
vertical integration can be welfare improving with respect to vertical separation
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by inducing innovation di¤usion.29
In the licensing game we have assumed that rmsoutside option in case of
an external patent holder is such that if the rm does not get the innovation the
rival rm does. This means that the outside option depends on the royalty rate.
Things are much di¤erent, in particular under complete technology di¤usion, if
we assume that either both rms get the innovation or neither does.30 Indeed,
in this case the outside option is constant with respect to the per-unit royalty so
that the upstream innovator, via a two-part tari¤ contract, is able and nds it
protable to implement the monopoly outcome.31 Clearly, the vertical integra-
tion would not be privately protable anymore. In contrast, vertical integration
would result to be welfare improving as a quasi monopoly would be better than
a monopoly.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Exclusive licensing subgame
Suppose that the innovator o¤ers only one license, so that only one D rm
adopts the new input. Firm 1 does not get the new input and produces a nal
good of quality s1 = s at price p1; rm 2 adopts the new input and produces a
nal good of quality s2 =  s > s, at price p2 with s2 s1 = s (   1). Assuming
that both rms stay active in the market, the demands for the goods are dened
in (5) and (6). D rmsprots are:
1 = p1q1;
2 = (p2   r2) q2   F2:
In order to nd the Cournot equilibrium, we assume that the demands for
both goods are positive (formally, this means that 0 <  = p1s <
b = p2 p1s(  1) <
1), we derive the corresponding candidate equilibrium and we nally check
whether this is the e¤ective equilibrium.32 Cournot competition leads to the
following third stage quantity and price equilibrium:
q1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
s + r2
s (4   1) ;
q2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
(2s   s  2r2)
s (4   1) ;
p1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s + r2)
(4   1) ;
p2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
(2   1) (s + r2)
(4   1) ;
32See the inequalities at page 25 and the ones at page 26. This way of proceeding is standard
in models of vertical di¤erentiation (see, among others, Wauthy 1996).
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with q2 (r2; 0; s ; s) > 0 () s(2  1)2 > r2. Firm1 prot is then:
1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s + r2)
2
(4   1)2 s (8)
As for rm 2:
2 (r2; 0; s ; s) =
 (s  2s + 2r2)2
(4   1)2 s :
The U rm chooses the two-part tari¤ contract for rm 2 (r2; F2) such that:
max
r2;F2
U
s:t:r2  s (2   1)
2
0  F2  2 (r2; 0; s ; s)  2 (0; r2; s; s )
with U =
(2s  s 2r2)
s(4  1) r2 + F2   f and
2 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(s + r2)
2
(4   1)2 s ; (9)
if we reasonably assume that r1 = r2 (D rms are symmetric so that the equi-
librium royalty set by the U innovator would be equal for either D rm). The
rst constraint comes from the non-negativity of q2 and the second constraint
(binding at equilibrium) ensures that rm 2 has the incentive to get the license
rather than the outside option, that is not buying the innovation given that the
rival rm 1 would get it.33 The maximization problem thus becomes
max
r2
"
(2s   s  2r2)
s (4   1) r2 +
 
 (s  2s + 2r2)2
(4   1)2 s  
(s + r2)
2
(4   1)2 s
!#
This objective is concave in r2 and the maximum is r2 =   s2 . Under non-
negative royalties, the solution is a contract such that (superscript EL stands
for exclusive licensing):
rEL2 = 0; F
EL
2 =
(   1) s 
(4   1) :
Equilibrium quantities and prices are:
qEL1 = (4   1) 1  ; qEL2 =
(2   1)
(4   1) ; Q
EL =
2 
4   1 < 1
pEL1 =
 s
(4   1) ; p
EL
2 =
(2   1) s
(4   1) ;bEL = 2  
(4   1)
33Note that in case of FR policy, the outside option of rm 2 is to buy the innovation
knowing that if it does not get it, nobody will.
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Equilibrium prots are:
EL1 (s; s ) = 
EL
2 (s ; s) =
 2s
(4   1)2
ELU =
(   1) s 
(4   1)   f: (10)
Producer surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare are:
PSEL =
(4 2 3 +1)s 
(4  1)2   f;
CSEL =
( +4 2 1)s 
2(4  1)2 ;
SWEL =
(12 2 5 +1)s 
2(4  1)2   f:
ELU dened in (10) is the U patent holder equilibrium prot under exclusive
licensing, when selling via a two-part tari¤, which reduces to a xed fee, the
new input to only one D rm. We check whether at equilibrium, the conditions
for both rms to stay in the market are satised, and we nd that they are:
p2 < p1 + s (   1) () (   1) (2   1) s
(1  4 ) < 0;8 ;
p2 > p1 () (   1) s 
(4   1) > 0;8 :
Consider now the case of negative royalties, the optimal contract under ex-
clusive licensing is then such that:
rNeg2 =  
s
2
; FNeg2 =
 
4 2 + 1

s
4 (4   1) : (11)
Equilibrium quantities, prices, rmsprots, the external patentees equilibrium
prot, producer surplus, consumer surplus and social welfare are (superscript
ELneg stands for exclusive licensing and negative royalties):
qELneg1 (0; r2; s; s ) =
(2   1)
2 (4   1) ; q
ELneg
2 = 2
 
(4   1) ; Q
ELneg =
6   1
2 (4   1) < 1
pELneg1 =
(2   1) s
2 (4   1) < p
ELneg
2 =
s (2   1)2
2 (4   1)
ELneg2 (s ; s) =
(2   1)2 s
4 (4   1)2 = 
ELneg
1 (s; s )
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ELnegU =
(2   1)2 s
4 (4   1)   f; (12)
PSELneg = (2  1)
2s
4(4  1) + 2
(2  1)2s
4(4  1)2   f =
(2  1)2(4 +1)s
4(4  1)2   f;
CSELneg =
(20 2 12 +16 3+1)s
8(4  1)2 ;
SWELneg =
(48 3 4 2 12 +3)s
8(4  1)2   f:
bELneg = (2   1)
(4   1)
Note that under both cases of non-negative and negative royalties, the D rms
are worse o¤with respect to the status quo.34 However, if either rm thinks that
the rival is not making an o¤er, then this rm will have the incentive to make a
slightly positive o¤er and get the innovation and this reasoning holds up to the
outside option. Note also that, as one could expect ELU  ELnegU =   s4(4  1) <
0, the patent holder prefers not being constrained to non-negative royalties.
Also, from the industry point of view, EL ELneg = s4(4  1) > 0, given that
under negative royalties production is subsidized. However, computing the joint
prots of the patent holder and the licensee under vertical separation we nd
that ELU + 
EL
2 (s ; s) = 
ELneg
U + 
ELneg
2 (s ; s), that is the two separated
subjects, jointly, are indi¤erent between negative and non-negative royalties. As
for consumers and social welfare we nd that:
CSEL   CSELneg = ( +4 
2 1)s 
2(4  1)2  
(20 2 12 +16 3+1)s
8(4  1)2 =  
1
8
s < 0;
SWEL   SWELneg = (12 
2 5 +1)s 
2(4  1)2  
(48 3 4 2 12 +3)s
8(4  1)2 =  
(4   3) s
8 (4   1) < 0:
Finally, we verify that, also at this equilibrium, the conditions for both rms to
stay in the market are satised:
p2 < p1 + s (   1) ()  2s    1
4   1 < 0;8 ;
p2 > p1 () 1
2
s (2   1)    1
4   1 > 0;8 :
8.2 Complete technology di¤usion subgame
Suppose the U rm decides to o¤er two licenses, m = 2. In this case, the patent
holder will also set a minimum bid b, otherwise no rm would make a positive
o¤er because each rm is guaranteed to have a license irrespective of its bid.
34Formally:  
2s
(4  1)2  
s
9
=   1
9
s (7   1)   1
(4  1)2 < 0 and
(2  1)2s
4(4  1)2  
s
9
=
  1
36
s (2 + 1) 14  5
(4  1)2 < 0.
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When the policy m = 2, r and b is o¤ered, in equilibrium each rm will o¤er
this minimum bid, b.35 The U rm maximization problem is:
max
F1;r1;F2;r2
fr1q1 (r1; r2; s ; s ) + r2q2 (r1; r2; s ; s ) + F1 + F2   fg (13)
s:t:1 (r1; r2; s ; s )  F1  1 (0; r2; s; s )
2 (r2; r1; s ; s )  F2  2 (0; r1; s; s )
F1  0; F2  0
where 1 (0; r2; s; s ) is dened in (8) for rm 2. Here the outside option for each
rm is not buying the new input given that the rival rm does. The optimal xed
fee corresponding to b is i (ri; rj ; s ; s ) i (0; rj ; s; s ). i (ri; rj ; s ; s ) and
qi (ri; rj ; s ; s ) denote the third stage equilibrium D rm i prot and quantity
when both rms produce the high quality good, namely:
i (ri; rj ; s ; s ) =
(s   2ri + rj)2
9 s
; (14)
qi (ri; rj ; s ; s ) =
1
3s 
(s   2ri + rj) : (15)
pi (ri; rj ; s ; s ) = s 

1  1
3s 
(s   2ri + rj)  1
3s 
(s   2rj + ri)

As the two constraints are binding at equilibrium, we have
F1 (r1; r2) = 1 (r1; r2; s ; s )  1 (0; r2; s; s ) ;
F2 (r1; r2) = 2 (r2; r1; s ; s )  2 (0; r1; s; s ) ;
with i (0; rj ; s; s ) =
(s +rj)
2
(4  1)2s . The maximization problem, thus becomes:
max
r1;r2
fr1q1 (r1; r2; s ; s ) + r2q2 (r2; r1; s ; s ) + F1 (r1; r2) + F2 (r1; r2)  fg :
Solving this problem we nd that under non-negative royalties, the optimal
contract is:8<: r1 = r2 = rT =
(s  26s 2+16s 3)
64 2 14 +4 , F
T
 
rT ; rT

=
(248 2 17  272 3+256 4+1)s 
4(32 2 7 +2)2 if    
T ,
r1 = r2 = 0, FT (0; 0) =
(  1)(16  1)s 
9(4  1)2 if  <  
T .
where rT  0 ()    T = 1:585 6. This means that when the innovation
is small the inventors incentive is to set a per-unit price as low as possible,
that is the optimal contract is a xed fee. In other words, given the positive
outside option of producing the low quality good at zero marginal cost, for small
innovations the inventor cannot set a positive per unit royalty. In contrast for
large innovations we have a positive per-unit royalty.
35 In case the innovator o¤ers two licenses, the AR and the FR policy coincide. See Liao
and Sen (2005) for details.
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If we allow for negative royalties, the optimal contract is the rst line of (7)
for any innovation size. Note that for a small innovation size ( <  T ), the
U monopolist is willing to subsidize the D production, however in this case the
explanation is not the incentive to make the D a¢ liates more aggressive but the
presence of the outside option: each D rm can always produce the low quality
good at zero marginal cost and make positive prot. To induce them to buy the
small innovation the inventor cannot set a positive per unit royalty.
Equilibrium magnitudes are for    T , and for any innovation size under
negative royalties:
qT (s ) =
(4 +16 2+1)
2(32 2 7 +2) ; Q
T =
(16 2+4 +1)
(32 2 7 +2)
pT =
(16 2 11 +1) s
(32 2 7 +2)
T (s ) =
(4 +16 2+1)
2
s 
4(32 2 7 +2)2
with QT < 1 as
 
16 2 + 4 + 1
    32 2   7 + 2 = 11   16 2   1 < 0,
which also implies pT < s ;
TU (s ) =
(16 2 16 +1)s 
2(32 2 7 +2)   f; (16)
PST =
(16 2 11 +1)(4 +16 2+1)s 
(32 2 7 +2)2   f;
CST =
(4 +16 2+1)
2
s 
2(32 2 7 +2)2 ;
SWT =
3
2
(16 2 6 +1)(4 +16 2+1)s 
(32 2 7 +2)2   f:
Whereas for  <  T , in case of non-negative royalties, equilibrium magni-
tudes are:
qTd (s ) =
1
3
; QTd =
2
3
;
pTd (s ) =
s 
3
;
Td (s ) =
s 
9
:
Notice that at equilibrium it always holds that pTd (s ) =
s 
3 < s .
TUd (s ) = 2F
T (0; 0)  f = 2 (  1)(16  1)s 
9(4  1)2   f; (17)
PSTd =
2
9
 s  f; CSTd =
2
9
 s;
SWTd =
4
9
 s  f:
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Given the equilibrium analysis of Sections (8.1) and (8.2), direct comparisons
of (12), (10), (16) and (17) show that:
ELU  TU =
8<: for    T , (  1)s (4  1)  
(16 2 16 +1)s 
2(32 2 7 +2) = s 
(2 2 2  3)
2(32 2 7 +2)(4  1) > 0 ()  > 1:8   
for  <  T , (  1)s (4  1)   2 (  1)(16  1)s 9(4  1)2 =
(4  7)(  1)s 
9(4  1)2 < 0
;
ELnegU  TU = (2  1)
2s
4(4  1)  
(16 2 16 +1)s 
2(32 2 7 +2) =
(28 2 13 +4 3+2)s
4(32 2 7 +2)(4  1) > 0:
8.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Straightforward comparisons with respect to the status quo show that the con-
sumer surplus is higher: CST   CS > 0, CSTd   CS > 0, CSEL   CS >
0, CSELneg   CS > 0; as for social welfare, as long as f is not too large
SWT   SW > 0, SWTd   SW > 0, SWEL   SW > 0, SWELneg   SW > 0; as
for the licensees, they are worse o¤, ELi (s ; s) i < 0, ELnegi (s ; s) i < 0,
T (s )  FT  rT ; rT   i < 0, and Td (s )  FT (0; 0)  i < 0.
8.5 Proof of Corollary 4
As already pointed out, SWEL < SWELneg, this comparison is relevant for
 >  . Also:
for    T ,
8>>><>>>:
SWELneg   SWT = (971 
2 144  3644 3+7932 4 9680 5+5120 6+12)
8(32 2 7 +2)2(4  1)2 s > 0
CSELneg   CST = s 80 +593 2 3068 3+10 004 4 18 416 5+13 312 6+4
8(4  1)2( 7 +32 2+2)2 > 0
PSELneg   PST =  s 32  189 2+288 3+1036 4 4368 5+4096 6 4
4(4  1)2( 7 +32 2+2)2 < 0
;
for  <  T ,
8>><>>:
SWELneg   SWTd =   (
140  220 2+80 3 27)
72(4  1)2 s > 0
CSELneg   CSTd =  s 124  308 
2+112 3 9
72(4  1)2 > 0
PSELneg   PSTd = s (2 + 1)  26 +8 
2+9
36(4  1)2 < 0
:
8.6 Vertical integration subgame
Consider the quantity competition between the VI rm and rm 1 producing
the high quality nal good. The VI rm has zero variable production costs as
the new input is transferred at the marginal cost c2 = 0, whereas rm 1 incurs
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marginal cost r1. The third stage equilibrium quantities and prots are:
qV I (0; r1; s ; s ) =
1
3s 
(s + r1)
q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) =
1
3s 
(s   2r1)  0 () r1  s 
2
pV I = s (1  qV I (0; r1; s ; s )  q1 (r1; 0; s ; s )) = 1
3
(s + r1)
V I (0; r1; s ; s ) =
(s + r1)
2
9s 
  f
1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) =
(s   2r1)2
9 s
where qV I (0; r1; s ; s ) and q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) are obtained from expression (15)
substituting properly ri and rj ; V I (0; r1; s ; s ) and 1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) are ob-
tained from expression (14) substituting properly ri and rj . The VI rm o¤ers
rm 1 the two-part tari¤ contract (r1; F1) such that:36
max
r1;F1
fV I (0; r1; s ; s ) + r1q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) + F1g
s:t:1 (r1; 0; s ; s )  F1  1 (0; 0; s; s )
r1  s 
2
;
where 1 (0; 0; s; s ) =
 2s
(4  1)2 , obtained from (8) is rm 1 outside option. As
the rst constraint is binding at equilibrium, we have:
max
r1
fV I (0; r1; s ; s ) + r1q1 (r1; 0; s ; s ) + 1 (r1; 0; s ; s )  1 (0; 0; s; s )g
The optimal contract is then:
r1 = s
 
2
; F 1 =  
 2s
(4   1)2 :
If we let the VI rm to set negative fees, the vertical merger implements the
monopoly outcome by inducing the nonintegrated rm to produce a nil quantity
(foreclosure) and compensating it for the outside option. Equilibrium magni-
36 In the following maximization problem we do not restrict the VI rm to set nonnegative
fees. This allows us to make clear its incentives. We next solve the maximization problem
constrained to nonnegative fees.
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tudes are:
qV I (0; r

1 ; s ; s ) =
1
2
= qm; q1 (r

1 ; 0; s ; s ) = 0;
pV I =
1
2
 s = pm;
V I (0; r

1 ; s ; s ) =
1
4
 s; 1 (r

1 ; 0; s ; s )  F 1 =
 2s
(4   1)2 ;
V I = V I (0; r

1 ; s ; s )  f + r1q1 (r1 ; 0; s ; s ) + F 1 =
1
4
 s   
2s
(4   1)2   f:
However negative fees would be clearly held to be illegal by antitrust authorities.
It is clear from the analysis above that the VI rm wants to restrict as much
as possible the quantity produced by the non a¢ liate rm so as to (at least)
partially internalize the vertical externality.
If the VI rm is constrained to nonnegative fees, it will optimally let the
nona¢ liate rm to produce a positive quantity as low as possible (up to its
outside option) q1 (r1) : 1 (r1) =
 2s
(4  1)2 . Given the Cournot equilibrium
quantities, we have
1
3
(s + r1)  r1

1
3s 
(s   2r1) =  
2s
(4   1)2
() r1 =
 
 s (4   1)  3s p 
2 (4   1) :
The optimal contract is then:
rV I = s
 
 (4   1)  3 p 
2 (4   1) > 0; FV I = 0; (18)
with rV I < s
 
2 for any  and
@
@ rV I > 0.
37 Equilibrium quantities and price
are:
qV I (0; rV I ; s ; s ) =
 
4 2    p    
2 (4   1) ;
q1 (rV I ; 0; s ; s ) =
p
 
(4   1) ;
QV I = qV I (0; rV I ; s ; s ) + q1 (rV I ; 0; s ; s ) =

4 2    +  32

2 (4   1) ;
pV I =
 
 
4  p   1 s
2 (4   1) :
37Note that lim !1 rV I =1 and lim !1 qV I = 0.
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with QV I < 1 as

4 2    +  32

  2 (4   1) =    4  p   1 < 0.
Equilibrium prots, CS, PS and SW are:
V I (0; rV I ; s ; s ) =
 
4 2    p    2 s
4 (4   1)2  ;
1 (rV I ; 0; s ; s )  FV I = s 
2
(4   1)2 ;
V I = V I (0; rV I ; s ; s )  f + rV Iq1 (rV I ; 0; s ; s ) + FV I = (16 
2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2 ;
(19)
CSV I =
(4 +
p
  1)2s 
8(4  1)2 ;
PSV I =
s 2
(4  1)2 +
(16 2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2 ;
SWV I =
(4 +
p
  1)2s 
8(4  1)2 +
s 2
(4  1)2 +
(16 2 13 +1)s 
4(4  1)2 :
Note that the optimal contract is the same if we allow for negative royalties, as
the VI rm has always incentive to set a positive royalty.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof comes from the VI rm maximization problem, given that it could
always decide not to sell the license and get prot equal to V I (0; 0; s ; s) =
(2  1)2s 
(4  1)2 < V I dened in expression (19).
8.8 Proof of Proposition 6
As far as the private protability is concerned, we wonder whether the patent
holder prefers to stay out of the market or to vertically integrate with either rm
given the outcome of the possible subgames previously analysed. We nd that
vertical integration is always privately protable. Namely, comparing the prot
under VI (V I) with the joint prot under VS (the prot of the external patent
holder plus the prot of either potential licensee), we obtain under non-negative
royalties:
for  >  , V I  
 
ELU + 
EL
i (s; s )

= 3(  1)s 
4(4  1)2 > 0;
for  2
h
 T ;  
i
, V I  
 
TU + 
T (s )  FT  rT ; rT  = 54s 2 (256 4 57 2 112 3 7 +1)(32 2 7 +2)2(4  1)2 > 0;
for  <  T , V I  
 
TUd + 
T (s )  FT  rT ; rT  = (  1)(16  1)s 
36(4  1)2 > 0;
and under negative royalties:
V I  

ELnegU + i (ri; 0; s ; s)

= 3(  1)s 
4(4  1)2 > 0:
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As for the social protability, we nd that vertical integration is socially
protable for large innovations, whereas it is welfare detrimental for small in-
novations. Namely, we make the following comparisons, under non-negative
royalties:
for  >  ;
8>>>><>>>>:
SWV I   SWEL =

8 
5
2 5 2 2 32  

s
8(4  1)2 > 0
CSV I   CSEL = s (4  1)2

(4 +
p
  1)2
8  
( +4 2 1)
2

> 0
PSV I   PSEL = 3(  1)s 4(4  1)2 > 0
for  2
h
 T ;  
i
;
8>>>>><>>>>>:
SWV I   SWT =
s 
p
 

45  180 2+256 3 2p +7 32 32 52 4

32 2 7 +15p  60 32+2

8(2
p
 +1)
2
(2
p
  1)2(32 2 7 +2)2
< 0
CSV I   CST = s 

(4 +
p
  1)2
8(4  1)2  
(4 +16 2+1)
2
2(32 2 7 +2)2

< 0
PSV I   PST =   (1977 
2 253  4048 3+1024 4+4)s 2
4(32 2 7 +2)2(4  1)2 > 0
for  <  T ;
8>>>><>>>>:
SWV I   SWTd =  s

(4 +
p
  1)2
8(4  1)2 +
 
(4  1)2 +
(16 2 13 +1)
4(4  1)2   49

< 0
CSV I   CSTd =

(4 +
p
  1)2
8(4  1)2   29

 s < 0
PSCV I   PSTd = (  1)(16  1)s 36(4  1)2 > 0
And, under negative royalties:
SWV I   SWELneg = s

15  21 2 2 32+8 52 3

8(4  1)2 > 0 ()  > 5:85    >  ;
CSV I   CSELneg = s

(4 +
p
  1)2  (20 2 12 +16 3+1)

8(4  1)2 < 0;
PSV I   PSELneg = s ( +3 
2 1)
4(4  1)2 > 0:
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